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Abstract  
The article focuses on the theoretically and empirically addressed question of whether 
workforce literacy strategies in research and policies may tend to exclude relevant fields 
of literacy, which have emancipatory chances for participants, but which regularly fail 
to include low qualified or literate adults (Hufer, 2013), namely the area of basic civic 
education or political literacy. First, a theoretical discussion makes use of recent 
publications. The relevance of basic civic education will be discussed using contemporary 
theories, which point at a crisis of democracy and explain this by the spread of income 
and capital (Piketty, 2014) and its legitimation (Rosanvallon, 2013). Further detail is 
provided by using Rosanvallons criticism of the term ‘equality of chances’. The everyday 
unfairness, covered by the narrative of equal chances, leads to peoples’ disengagement 
from reciprocal relations and disintegration of solidarity within a society. This 
theoretical approach will then be supplemented by empirical data. The empirical 
research question is:  Do adults with low literacy skills agree less often on feelings of 
political efficacy and social trust than adults with high literacy skills? Do they engage 
less often in volunteering than adults with high literacy skills? This is based the PIAAC 
2012 dataset which relates literacy on the one hand with variables of political efficacy, 
social trust and volunteering on the other hand. Results will be compared with volunteer 
and youth surveys. Furthermore, the connection of a “Nouvelle Droite” (contemporary 
right-wing populism) and peoples’ low feelings of political efficacy will be reflected in 
order to refute the stereotype that marginalized groups automatically become voters of 
right-wing populists. 
 
Keywords: basic citizenship education; citizenship education; literacy; political literacy; 
PIAAC 
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Introduction 
National strategies for literacy1 have often been launched as an answer to large-scale 
assessments, like the Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies 
(PIAAC) or the German Level-One Survey (LEO). The strategies focus on employment 
and employability, workplace and family literacy.  
Literacy is a value on its own, without needing legitimization via employability. 
Indeed, the Austrian scientist Ribolits points out that literacy is relevant for humanistic 
reasons and also potentially enables people to act in a non-alienated, emancipated way 
(Ribolits, 2009). The economic argument, however, is not the only one driving national 
strategies for literacy. As the French economist Thomas Piketty (2014) and the French 
philosopher Pierre Rosanvallon (2013) discuss (see below), societies are losing their 
cohesion. Financial and social inequalities and the narrative of equal chances may lead to 
the instabililty of democracies. By not addressing countries as economies but as 
democracies, the attention shifts remarkably. 
Therefore this article discusses what empirical data tell us about political and social 
participation among low and highly skilled adults. Thus it fuels the discussion whether 
national strategies for literacy should have a broader approach, including both 
employability and citizenship as their aim, instead of prioritizing employment.  
As the current databases do not offer variables on literacy and political participation, 
this analysis will draw on variables about literacy and political efficacy2 from the current 
PIAAC survey (Rammstedt, 2013). Feelings of political efficacy are not the same as real 
political participation, but they correlate (see below). Further indicators will be social 
trust and volunteering. 
Descriptions of adults with low skills, detailed in four chapters (work and family, 
reading skills, literacy practices and participation in adult education) have recently been 
published by the OECD (Grotlüschen, Mallows, Reder & Sabatini, 2016). This article 
complements these recently published chapters by focusing on the three variables 
political efficacy, social trust and volunteering and by comparing low-literate adults with 
high-literate adults across the countries participating in PIAAC. The statistical method 
followed the above mentioned publications’ scheme. The literacy scale has been divided 
into low literacy competence, defined here as ‘below 225 points on the PIAAC scale’, 
which equals PIAAC level one and below - and high literacy competence, defined as 
‘above 375 points on the PIAAC scale’, which equals PIAAC level four and above. The 
first round data have been used (all countries’ datasets, data collection from 2012) with 
the statistical software ‘Stata’ and the ‘PIAAC repest module’ co-developed by Francois 
Keslair from OECD. This module allows for fully taking into consideration all ten 
plausible values for the literacy variable as well as the sample weights. 
Crosstabulations have been calculated between literacy levels and the three variables 
political efficacy, social trust and volunteering. Low literate and high literate subgroups 
then are compared and compiled into a graph showing results on international level. The 
significance is expressed by standard errors. While the graphs show all results, the 
interpretation of results in this article only refers to statistically significant differences. 
Because of the large sample even small differences of a few percent points are significant 
in PIAAC. Controlling for sociodemographics and performance variables like education 
and employment would definitely reduce the correlation and show how strong the 
influence of literacy is onto political efficacy, social trust or volunteering ¾if the 
influences of education and others are kept aside (which would be a causal relation that 
would require strong theoretical background¾and which obviously is too linear to meet 
the reality).  
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But this is not the research question here¾ the question is to describe the low-literate 
population in contrast to high-literate adults with literacy being a result of formal 
education as well as literacy practices and many other factors.  
The reason to crosstabulate literacy instead of formal education (as it is reported in 
regular surveys on volunteering and youth, see below) is that the current political attention 
focuses low-literate adults and not low formally educated adults. Thus it makes sense to 
use the literacy variable even if it has a high correlation with education.  
It was decided to fully report all countries’ results in the graphs but focus on three 
special countries in the interpretation. The reason is twofold. On the one hand, an 
interpretation needs sound knowledge about the political system and its recent 
development which would take much longer discussion and explanation than is provided 
here. On the other hand, the three countries in focus experienced shifts to the right wing 
in their political landscape shortly after the PIAAC data collection and the shifts were 
discussed in mass media with high concern. Meanwhile, many other countries face the 
same problem (or always had before). But this was not yet clear when this article was 
computed and the shifts now take with more and more distance to the year of data 
collection (2012). Thus, three countries are selected here: Germany newly saw right wing 
populism in the streets as well as a new political party at the same time when the borders 
were open for refugees in September 2015. France had strong Front National results in 
regional elections in December 2015. Poland voted for a nationalist government in 
October 2015. All this took place in or close before this article was compiled. Thus, the 
interpretation of results keeps a special look onto these three countries. 
 
Workforce literacy programs versus basic civic education: the German case  
Via the Level-One Survey, published in 2011, it became clear that more than seven 
million German adults (14,5% of the adult population aged 18-64) read and write on a 
level that equates the international UNESCO definition of functional illiteracy 
(Grotlüschen & Riekmann, 2012). Follow-up programs funded by the federal ministry of 
education, the federal laender and the European commission prioritize literacy programs 
addressing the workforce and their needs in the workplace. 
The international PIAAC survey confirmed the results: According to PIAAC, 17,5% 
of German adults aged 16- 64 belong to reading literacy competence level I and below, 
the international average being 15,5% (OECD, 2013; Rammstedt, 2013). The description 
of this level does not equal the LEO descriptions, so this subpopulation should not be 
called functionally illiterate¾ for this article we will consider this subpopulation as 
adults with low literacy skills. Still, there are substantial concerns about this group, and 
these concerns drive the development of national strategies and educational programs to 
improve adult literacy. 
This article focuses on the relevance of basic civic education for adults with low 
literacy skills, whether they are excluded from political participation and how the 
theoretical explanations for differences in political and social participation of population 
subgroups have developed. Therefore the research question is:  
 
• Do adults with low literacy skills agree less often on feelings of political efficacy 
and social trust than adults with high literacy skills?  
• Do they engage less often in volunteering than adults with high literacy skills?  
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If so, it may be discussed whether low-literate adults’ higher agreements to feelings of 
political efficacy and engagement were desirable (actually political efficacy can be 
performed by joining extremist groups as well which is not desirable from the standpoint 
of democratic states). It is also relevant to take into consideration whether national 
literacy strategies then also should focus on the theoretical and practical improvement of 
basic civic education.3 
To answer these questions, the following sections will analyse recent theoretical 
approaches which give the three variables a broader sense and meaning. The approaches 
do not follow the rational-choice approach, partly underlying the PIAAC theoretical 
framework (OECD, 2011), but substantially exceed the idea of a ‘homo economicus’. We 
prefer a recent French philosophers’ discussion of a ‘homo reciprocans’ (see below, 
Rosanvallon, 2013).  
 
Economic inequalities (Piketty) and their ideological legitimization via the narrative 
of equal chances (Rosanvallon) 
Current assumptions about the situation of economies and societies¾especially in the 
U.S.A. and France¾are strongly influenced the most recent publications in political 
sciences and economics. Highly relevant discussions have followed the publication of 
Capital in the 21st Century by French economist Thomas Piketty 
(Kaufmann, & Stützl, 2015; Piketty, 2014). Piketty analysed tax data over two centuries 
and concluded: Firstly, capital grows faster than income¾his famous formula ‘r > g’ 
(revenue exceeds growth) receives some criticism, especially because of the database. 
Although interesting, this first conclusion is not so relevant for this article, so I do not 
discuss it further.  
Secondly, Piketty concludes that the economic gaps in France and the US have 
increased since the 1980s, after having decreased for roughly 200 years because of 
revolutions, democratic developments, war and socio-political change. Piketty’s second 
conclusion can be confirmed at least for Germany from regular reports on poverty and 
wealth [Armuts- und Reichtumsberichte]4.  
Piketty suggests global tax policies as well as higher taxation of the richest sections 
of societies (Kaufmann, & Stützle, 2015). His core focus is the ‘equality of distribution’, 
pointing at financial and economical inequalities.  
While Piketty has been much discussed in the US since 2014, he was known much 
earlier in France for his analyses. The trade-unionist and scientist at the Collège de 
France, Pierre Rosanvallon, uses Piketty’s results as a starting point for his theoretical 
approach in Society of Equals (Rosanvallon, 2013).  
Rosanvallon uses the economical ‘(in)equality of distribution’ and asks about the 
legitimization of this kind of (in)equality in modern societies. He asks about the 
assumptions about communities and relations which allow inequality to be understood as 
fair. A core narrative in modern societies seems to be the idea of ‘equality of chances’. 
This narrative assumes that economic distribution is fair, as long as all members of a 
society have the same chance to climb the socioeconomic ladder by relying on their own 
performance and thus qualify for the income they receive. 
According to Rosanvallon, the model has three consequences (2013):  
Firstly, the idea of equality of chances delegitimizes instruments that rearrange economic 
possessions such as taxes, social insurances and social benefits. Thus, unsuccessful 
individuals are interpreted as responsible for their lack of success and income (blaming the 
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victim), while at the same time non-meritocratic, structural effects and exclusions from 
labour markets or respected societal positions become invisible. (pp. 303- 304) 
Secondly, the idea of equality of chances has no upper limit for an annual income that 
can legitimately be received because of high performance. This may even lead to 
accepting spectacular forms of income, as long as it is taken for granted that the income 
relates to individual performance (ibid). Even CEO incomes that sometimes exceed more 
than two hundred times the income of an average employee (cf. Mishel & Davis, 2015) 
seem to be legitimate in this narrative. 
The third aspect is the lower limit of what people need to be able to live in a society. 
Charity and humanity become the legitimation of defining the minimum social benefit, 
but not solidarity among members of a states’ population (ibid, p. 304). This also means 
that social benefits can always be lowered or cut – and those who receive them feel 
ashamed about their status. Andrea Liesner, a Hamburg-based educational researcher, 
quotes Stéphane Hessel (Indignez-vous!) and states that average indignation in Germany 
is not focused on the cutting of social benefits, but the fact that some social benefits still 
remain, stating benefits would lead to passivity and lack of discipline amongst those who 
receive them (Liesner, 2012, p. 59). 
Equality of chances is an idea and a narrative, but the real distributions follow many 
other aspects, like family background and social heritage.5 The consequences of this non-
fulfilment of the narrative lead to dismissed reciprocity (2013, p. 325), which I will 
understand here as disengagement from solidarity. Reciprocity is part of a larger theory 
of equality in Rosanvallon’s approach. The three parts of a theory of equality consist of 
singularity, reciprocity and communality which he suggests for a better legitimation of 
the distribution of income. But as this paper does not use the complete sociological theory 
of Rosanvallon, the other aspects are not discussed here.  
The reason for this disengagement is – according to Rosanvallon – the assumption 
that balanced participation on the one hand and the common refusal of free-riding are no 
longer the moral bases of the majority in contemporary societies. In exaggerated terms, 
upper, middle and lower classes would each have their own reasons to disengage by 
thinking the others do not show solidarity anymore:  
 
• Celebrities and the super rich face the temptation to quit their country and pay tax 
in other (cheaper) areas of the world, if they do not feel they belong to their 
country anymore.  
• Recipients of benefits experience disrespect and disdain (Verhöhnung, 
Butterwegge, 2015) of their status, instead of receiving solidarity from others 
towards their social group and ask themselves whether they would do better to 
adapt to the stereotypes that are told about them and in fact avoid controls and 
become deviant.  
• Middle classes wonder whether they are the only ones sticking to the rules 
between those who might be avoiding taxation and those they assume to receive 
more benefits than they should. In case middle classes then fight back, their aims 
are to attack political and economic elites and as well as refugees or migrants. 
 
The political consequences of low solidarity and reciprocity may well fuel the rise of 
populism as Rosanvallon states:  
In sociological terms, the crisis of reciprocity is reflected in the malaise of the middle and 
working classes. Members of these groups who are employed see themselves as doubly 
penalized: their situations are not bad enough to receive the benefits of the welfare state, 
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yet they are not wealthy enough to enjoy the fiscal and other advantages available to the 
rich. Politically, their resentment has fueled the rise of the extreme right in Europe. Extreme 
right-wing parties have capitalized on frustrations due to the diffuse feeling that reciprocity 
has broken down, directing their fire at both the privileged elite and immigrants said to be 
taking advantage of the taxpayers’ generosity (Rosanvallon, 2013, p. 275). 
This line-up of three social classes struggling with each other for solidarity and 
distribution of chances and economic goods (as provided by Rosanvallon) is not yet 
complete. According to Jacques Rancière’s „Disagreement“ (Rancière, 2002), there are 
always groups that do not even have the opportunity to negotiate, as they are not 
recognized as members of society. Rancière points at the fact that politics does not happen 
among those who sit at the table, but only when poor (2002, p. 26), illegitimate groups 
start claiming their rights. He states that it is especially the poor who benefit from politics 
(whether precarious workers, benefit recipients, teenage parents, workers in monotonous 
jobs or retired people who cannot live from their pension alone). 
Rancière concludes that this is why poverty has been denied by dominant, prevailing 
groups for centuries (2002, p. 27). Politics start to happen when the part that has no part 
(Anteil der Anteillosen) finds their names and language, claims their part6 and step by step 
gets recognized as a legitimate part of society and solidarity.  
Silke Schreiber-Barsch used this approach with regard to participation in adult 
education (Schreiber-Barsch, 2009), while Nora Sternfeld used it for overall educational 
and transformative procedures (Sternfeld, 2009). Earlier works by Rancière focus on 
citizenship (1992, 2007) have been used by Vandenabeele, Reyskens & Wildemeersch to 
challenge mainstream concepts of active citizenship and lifelong learning (2011, p. 193). 
A subgroup of adults that in recent times left their invisibile position in industrialized 
societies is the so-called group of functionally illiterates7 or – in less stigmatising terms 
– adults with low literacy skills.  
 
Sociopolitical disengagement: PIAAC variables  
Adults on PIAAC competence level I and below (adults with low literacy skills or low-
literate adults) are the focus of national literacy strategies. To describe them and their 
sociopolitical engagement or disengagement, it is better to use literacy variables than 
formal education or socio-economic status for two reasons: First, formal education does 
not necessarily guarantee sufficient literacy competences throughout the adult lifespan. 
Second, adults without formal education can easily have a good literacy proficiency, 
especially in reading.8  
Thus, we use literacy (as definied in the narrow way according to international large-
scale assessments like PIAAC) in order to look closer at the subpopulation which is 
addressed by the „Literacy Decade” (2015-2025) in Germany. 
We assume that the tendency to disengage from a solidaritarian society may be 
higher for low-literate adults than for high-literate adults. This is specified as: 
 
(1) low feelings of “political efficacy”  
(2) low expression of “social trust” and therefore 
(3) less voluntary work than high-literate groups. 
  
All three aspects (political and social engagement or disengagement and consequently 
high or low readiness for volunteering) operationalize the theories discussed above. But 
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we do not focus on lower, middle or upper classes: This article focuses on literacy, not 
class (even if both correlate).  
The variables used in PIAAC need some specification. PIAAC is an economic 
survey based on human-capital and rational-choice theories. The latter seem to be the 
theoretical base to the variables political efficacy and social trust, even if the theoretical 
framework only mentions very few aspects of the theoretical discussion underlying the 
variables.9 Literacy and Education is said to predict economic outcomes as well as wider 
benefits on all sections of life: 
There is good empirical evidence that education not only affects labour market outcomes 
but is also a strong predictor of outcomes in other life domains. The [background 
questionnaire, AG] includes indicators of family formation (…), health (...), voluntary work 
(...), political efficacy (…) and social trust (OECD, 2011, p. 46). 
The assumptions about political efficacy and social trust rely on the idea of rational 
choices (homo oeconomicus), which mean humans vote or act socially as long as they 
think this makes sense because either it has an effect (political efficacy) or social acts will 
be reciprocated by others (social trust). Rational choice theories have often been 
criticized, mostly because they cannot explain altruism, friendship, morals, co-operation 
or solidarity in larger, functionally differentiated societies. Contemporary criticism comes 
from Pierre Rosanvallon, who prefers the idea of a homo reciprocans (2013, p. 319-320), 
who belongs to others and does not only individually or cognitively make rational 
decisions. In line with Rosanvallon, I prefer to interpret the PIAAC variables and results 
from the theoretical standpoint of reciprocal relations which make a society relevant for 
its members. 
Rosanvallon also clarifies his position by stating that a lack of social cohesion allows 
the Nouvelle Droite (contemporary right-wing populism) to expand and use the feelings 
of disengagement for introducing their egoistic ideology. 
The variables therefore have a connection with each other and can be read as 
indicators giving information about the democratic stability of societies and the dangers 
of right wing populists making use of social instability.  
I will now check the variables with the PIAAC dataset and compare international 
and intra-national results. Data have been computed because of a Thematic Report 
“Adults with Low Skills”, which was initiated by the OECD and has recently been 
published as OECD Education Working Paper 131 (deleted for anonymity). All countries 
have been included and all computations have been carried out with weighted datasets 
and plausible values, using the PIAAC repest module for the Stata software (designed by 
Francois Keslair, OECD). The English version of the questions reads as follows: 
 
• Volunteering: “In the last 12 months, how often, if at all, did you do voluntary 
work, including unpaid work for a charity, political party, trade union or other 
non-profit organization?”10 
• Political Efficacy: “People like me don't have any say about what the government 
does.”11 
• Social Trust: “There are only a few people you can trust completely.”12 
 
The analysis has been carried out by country and by literacy level. The results of the 
OECD partners Cyprus and Russia are shown in the graphs but will not be interpreted. 
Interpretation focuses on the OECD countries. 
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Findings by country and literacy level  
The analysis tries to describe the subpopulations of low-literate adults compared to high-
literate adults and specified by country. This does not mean literacy is the cause for 
political efficacy, social trust or volunteering. The question is how people with low 
literacy skills act and feel in their societies and how this differs from high-literate adults.  
Further discussion may take place and clarify whether the gaps should be seen as a reason 
for offering possibilities for political and social participation for them, including adult 
education.  
 
Findings and discussion: adults performing at literacy level I and below assume they 
have little political efficacy  
Political Efficacy has to be understood as one’s own feeling of having the capacity to 
understand politics enough to participate, and as the feeling of responsiveness of 
governments. The question has been operationalized negatively, asking about a lack of 
influence on governments. Critics state this might be a narrow definition of politics, as it 
is reduced to governments, political institutions and elections, while many other 
expressions of political activities – like demonstrations, petitions, ecological awareness, 
struggles against class, gender and race inequalities are left out of this definition. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Political Efficacy (Top Two Negative Answers) by Literacy Levels and Country 
(Quelle: PIAAC, 2012 data). 
 
Roughly two thirds of the German population at or below literacy Level I (65%) assume 
not to be able to influence their government. The gap between low and high-literate adults 
(23%) is rather large (more than 40 percentage points) and larger than the gaps of all other 
countries.  
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The narrative of ‘equality of chances’     [117] 
 
A closer look at Poland and France, two large but historically very different neighboring 
countries, shows interesting differences. While Germany has a large gap in 2012 (when 
the data was gathered), the northeastern neighbor Poland finds better feelings of political 
efficacy in the low subpopulation (59%) and worse for high-literate adults (31%). Poland 
changed their economic system to capitalism and their government to a democracy in an 
ongoing process in the 1980s. Four years later a nationalist government took over, but the 
data represent the situation in 2012.  
Geographically on the southwestern side, France faces nearly three quarters of low-
literates agreeing to the statement of feeling politically ineffective (73%). More striking, 
however, is the group of roughly 56% of the high-literate adults feeling disengaged from 
their government, this figure being the highest of all participating countries in 2012. 
Neither French conservative nor French socialist governmental actions seem to convince 
the contemporary French population of their political efficacy: Politics obviously 
disconnects with voters.  
The international results are robust and confirm the Mathew Effect, which is known 
for formal education, holding true for literacy competence as well. All countries’ low-
literate populations report lower political efficacies than the high-literate adults. These 
data do not mean low-literate adults are to be blamed for. The explanation by German 
political scientist Christoph Butterwegge seems more convincing: precarious groups and 
lower classes vote less often than others. So politicians, who depend on voters, organize 
their activities towards middle classes (Butterwegge, 2015). Therefore, the most 
precarious groups actually do not receive any response from their politicians, and thus the 
statement of being politically ineffective is simply true. This does not mean low-literate 
adults were politically uninterested; they still may protest or enjoy satirical shows. And 
they also may feel understood by nationalist and populist agitators – which is an 
expression of political thoughts and wills as well, even if it has nothing in common with 
democracy, solidarity or social cohesion. 
 
Findings and discussion: adults performing at literacy level I and below express low 
social trust  
Social trust is – for this analysis – an indicator representing the social cohesion of 
societies, as Rosanvallon claims. The question of whether to trust not only one’s 
government but also other members of society is – as explained above – most important 
for legitimizing monetary distributions within these societies. In case middle classes 
suspect upper classes of avoiding taxation and lower classes of illegally receiving more 
benefits than they have a legal right to, the middle classes feel exploited by others who 
do not stick to the rules. This would increase the tendency of social disengagement and a 
loss of solidarity.  
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Figure 2: Social Trust (Top Two Negative Answers) by Literacy Level and Country 
(Source: PIAAC 2012 data). 
 
Compared to other countries, Germany can build upon a rather good structure of social 
trust. Real solidarity seems to be most widespread in the Nordic countries, with the lowest 
values for mistrust for both high and low-literate adults.  
The international comparison shows again that Germany has quite a large gap 
between high and low-literate subpopulations and their feelings of social trust (25 
percentage points). However, in contrast to the other Nordic countries, Norway has the 
largest gap, with 30 percentage points. This surprising position in the international 
comparison could perhaps be explained by the recent extreme right terrorist act (Utoya, 
2011), but this does not explain the large gap within Norwegian society.  
Some 80 percent of low-literate Polish adults express social mistrust. This is higher 
than in Germany (76%) but lower than in France (85%).13 Rosanvallon, who explained 
his theories on a lack of social cohesion based on French and American history, can thus 
be confirmed for the case of France. The U.S.A. in the year 2012 does not show similarily 
severe difficulties regarding social trust (76% low-literate adults vs. 53% high-literate 
adults), but still a considerable number of low-literate adults seem to disconnect with their 
society. This may have become much worse in the past four years since the data were 
collected. 
Intra-national gaps are in all cases much larger than the international differences.  
 
Findings and discussion: adults performing at literacy level I and below participate 
less in volunteering  
Low feelings of social trust and political efficacy will be mirrored in lesser engagement 
for the society and community. It can be assumed that low-literate adults participate less 
often in non-governmental, non-profit organizations. 
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Social Trust:
Question: "There are only a few people you can 
trust completely."
Top Two Level 1 und darunter Top Two Level 4 und darüber
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It is important to keep in mind that inclusion and exclusion play a role here. Lower formal 
education or a migration background correlate with low integration in social 
organizations in Germany (Albert, Hurrelmann, & Quenzel, 2015). Literacy is not 
necessarily the most relevant factor. We also cannot conclude that low-literate adults are 
responsible for less volunteering, as they are sometimes smoothly excluded from non-
profit organizations by dominant, well-educated groups.  
Furthermore, the welfare regime of the economies and societies respectively is a 
relevant factor. The question as to whether social security is guaranteed by social law and 
transfer, or whether it has to be provided by the citizens themselves, does have an impact 
on the readiness to participate in voluntary work and engage for others in need. 
In fact, the two extremes, the traditionally neo-liberal, Anglo-American states, with 
their charity approach on the one hand, and the sociodemocratic Nordic countries, with 
guaranteed social welfare on the other can be found side by side in the higher ranks of the 
table. Roughly two thirds of low-literate adults state that they never volunteer (Norway: 
62%, USA: 64%), or looked at the other way around, roughly one third do participate in 
voluntary work. At the other end of the scale, we find France (86%) and Poland (87%), 
indicating that only some 13 or 14% of their low-literate populations get in touch with 
voluntary activities.  
 
 
 
Figure 3: Volunteering (Answer: Never) by Literacy Level and Country (Source: PIAAC 
2012 data). Differences between Germany and Poland/France are significant. Differences 
between Poland and France are not significant. 
 
Of Germany’s low-literate adults, some 81% state that they never volunteered, compared 
to high-literate adults, where about half of the group (52%) never entered non-profit 
organizations. The mechanisms of self-exclusion and external exclusion are not only 
relevant with regard to employment but also in non-profit organizations, as well as in 
global and local community activities. The findings are robust across countries.  
Adults performing at level IV and above are most often found volunteering in the US, 
Norway, Canada, Australia, Denmark and Finland. We assume that Anglo-American 
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Volunteering
Question: „In the last 12 months, how often, if at all, did you do voluntary work, 
including unpaid work for a charity, political party, trade union or other non-profit 
organization?“
Level 1 and below Level 4 and above
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societies with a more neoliberal tradition, who give responsibility for social aid to charity 
and volunteering structures, mix in the ranking with more egalitarian sociodemocratic 
welfare regimes, which offer public services (and therefore need less volunteering) but 
also face less social exclusion in their non-profit organizations. The findings for the level 
I and below subpopulations and the level IV and above subpopulations are quite similar 
to each other. 
 
Further discussion with regard to contemporary right-wing populism 
Calls for more civic education always become louder when populist, xenophobic and 
similar groups and parties are founded or elected. Civic education – especially for adults 
- cannot solve these problems alone, but it is still a relevant factor for prevention and for 
throwing light onto simplifying populist mechanisms and worldviews. Faced with the 
increasingly louder voice of nationalism in the political arena, this would seem to be quite 
necessary these days. 
However, by way of an explanation for nationalism and right-wing world views, 
often a special pattern is reproduced, claiming that economic losers, high unemployment, 
lack of perspectives for youth, low education and feelings of exclusion would lead to 
xenophobia (Heitmeyer, 2002). These explanations are tempting, but they ignore the fact 
that populists who act willingly to spread their right-wing ideology and try to recruit 
members for their movement or parties from such socioeconomic losers are needed. Thus, 
Heitmeyer’s unpolitical interpretation of neofascist activities in Germany has been 
fundamentally criticized (Dierbach, 2010).  
Sociological indicators, like an increasing divide between incomes, as well as the 
delegitimization of social transfers, which are shown above, can only be interpreted as 
the soil where neofascist or populist, xenophobic or nationalist seeds can grow. But it 
always needs people who willingly want to spread their right-wing ideology. Indeed, 
socially losing groups may equally feel attracted to left-wing approaches like Syriza or 
Podemos, who may listen to their needs and bring them to the political arena. That is the 
reason why political or civic education can be successful. 
Furthermore, the Leipzig Surveys on the economic middle classes and the political 
centre (so-called „Mitte-Studien“, Decker et al., 2016) point at the fact that right-wing 
populism becomes dangerous when and because it is accepted by the middle and center 
of societies. 
But nevertheless, the decrease of social cohesion always shows up a paradox 
regarding the lower classes and their participation in elections. Butterwegge (2015) 
argues: People who belong to lower classes or receive social benefit are underrepresented 
in elections, that is, many of them do not vote. Politicians then learn that lower classes 
seldom vote, so acting towards their needs would not result in winning elections – as a 
consequence, politicians care more for the middle classes and their claims and disregard 
the lower classes. If this assumption is true, lower classes, receivers of benefits as well as 
the low-literate among them were quite right in assuming they do not have any say in 
what the government does. 
 
Conclusions: relevance of political literacy and basic civic education? 
Conclusions here rely on two aspects of the article. The theoretical discussion informs 
about the mechanisms of material spread of income (Piketty) and its legitimization 
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(Rosanvallon) in current societies – and their impact on different classes within the social 
distribution. The empirical results about adults and their feeling of political efficacy and 
social trust as well as their participation opportunities in voluntary activities show large 
gaps between low-literate and high literate adults in all countries. 
The question as to whether all social classes can influence their societies‘ politics 
and whether governments and societies can rely on a certain degree of social cohesion 
and solidarity, seems highly relevant in times of refugees and migrants coming to Europe 
or at least trying to do so. Disengagement and decreasing solidarity, as Rosanvallon states, 
develop because of the feeling of having too little influence on the government. The 
narrative of equal chances delegitimizes taxation and social benefit and leads to conflicts 
regarding the spread of income and capital. Each social class can have the feeling that the 
other social classes take too much out of the commons and give back too little:  
 
• At the top end of the social hierarchy, spectacular cases of tax avoidance, extreme 
CEO incomes and corruption are reported. 
• Those who receive social benefit are shamed (by governments!) as unemployed 
lazybones14 or migrants only simulating their will to integrate15 into German 
society. 
• Parts of the middle classes try to keep together what they understand as theirs, 
protecting it against others by voting for populist parties and fighting against elites 
and migrants.  
 
The core question is whether these activities are carried out by a few people (and just 
made visible via mass media) within a solidarity society, or whether these few are already 
the majority. The parts of a society who agree to fund social benefits through their taxes 
are rather relevant for welfare regimes. The findings about political efficacy, social trust 
and volunteering thus can be read as indicators, pointing at the quality of social cohesion 
and solidarity in western societies. 
For the question of literacy and its correlation with political efficacy, social trust and 
volunteering, the findings confirm the thesis that all three indicators show lower results 
for subpopulations with low literacy skills. This is confirmed by qualitative research 
recently carried out in Germany with low-literate adults  (cf. Pape, 2011). This situation 
is dissatisfying for democratic societies with a tax-paid social welfare system. But it is 
also dissatisfying because the results can be interpreted as rather fewer possibilities for 
political participation for low-literate adults. Feelings of political efficacy correlate with 
taking political action (both in conventional ways, like voting, as well as in unorthodox 
ways, like the blockading of crossroads or public areas), as the political scientist Angelika 
Vetter shows (1998, p. 34 et seqq.). Relatively small parameter values for political 
efficacy – which can be shown for low-literate adults in all participating OECD countries 
– indicate restricted possibilities for political participation.  
This brings us back to the question asked at the beginning of this paper: if less 
participation in employment and work life, a higher risk of exclusion from the labor 
market, and low incomes in menial jobs are a reason to start programs on workforce 
literacy, shouldn’t the findings of this analysis lead to a discussion on political literacy? 
Shouldn’t the terms (political literacy, civic education, basic civic education) be discussed 
and didactical approaches be offered?  
Apart from this sociological reason for political literacy provision, several scholars claim 
for an emancipatory approach anyway (cf. Ribolits, 2009, p. 175 et seqq.) – without 
needing any statistical base for this, the starting point is normative, not empirically driven. 
The idea is that basic education cannot only help people adapt to social realities, but also 
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has to make an effort to teach people to understand and change the situation. Mere 
adaptation would lead to defensive learning, as German learning theorist Klaus Holzkamp 
states (1993), which appears in combination with unreflected learning reluctancies 
(Lernwiderstände, Faulstich, & Bayer, 2006). On the other hand, expansive learning 
(Holzkamp, 1993) aims at an expansion of one’s own sovereignty, both in material as 
well as in immaterial terms (deleted for anonymity).  
This would lead to adults who learn to clarify their interests, claim them and expand 
the areas where they can decide according to their values, interests and needs. This may 
be decisions about work and leisure time, for and against starting a family, long-term job 
security, knowledge of trade unions, tariffs and rights as workers, better income and 
affordable housing – all these aspects being more or less material improvements of one’s 
life. But expansive learning may also lead to better participation and embeddedness in 
political structures, in non-profit organizations, in better quality of friendships and 
personal relations as well as better understanding of contemporary aspects of life by 
reading weblogs or newspapers – just to name some examples for immaterial outcomes 
of expansive learning, especially with regard to political literacy. 
Thus it is from both perspectives (sociological and emancipatory) quite relevant to 
offer political literacy and workforce literacy side by side, instead of giving one of them 
full attention and neglecting the other. But it will be necessary to develop didactical 
settings for civic education that really attract low-literate adults by allowing them to 
clarify their interests and needs and to articulate them – and this may include the 
deconstruction of the narrative of equal chances – and find legitimizations for solidarity 
which understand and scrutinize the dominant neo-liberal ideology. 
 
Endnotes  
1 In this case we understand literacy as literacy competence in terms of the Programme of the International 
Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC), because we want to use PIAAC data for the analysis. Our 
reflection of the controversy on literacy relies especially on the New Literacy Studies (Grotlüschen, 
Heinemann & Nienkemper, 2009). 
2 See below for the theoretical concept of political efficacy and for the PIAAC theoretical framework.  
3 A rather well known construct can be seen in the international approach of basic, critical political 
education which relies on Oskar Negt’s notion of societal competences Zeuner (2013). This approach led 
to an international project under the leadership of Christine Zeuner (Dvorak, Zeuner, & Franke, 2005). So 
far, the relationship between Basic Education (Grund-Bildung) and Basic Competence (Grund-Kompetenz) 
seems rather unclear. 
4 Retrived from: www.armuts-und-reichtumsbericht.de 
5 Early studies show that the core selection mechanism in the German educational sustem, the transition to 
different school types after grade 4, is much more influenced by parents’ socioeconomic status than by the 
performance of the student (Lehmann, Peek, & Gänsfuß, 1997).  
6 When middle classes start claiming that refugee homes should not be built in their neighbourhood, the 
lack of a voice that would be heard by powerful groups becomes clear. Refugees’ possibilities to make a 
claim are not verbal – they consist of self-vulnerating actions like starting fires in their own camps, going 
on hunger strikes, risking dangerous flight routes and vulnerating practices like stitching up ones’ own lips.  
7 Labeling groups of people always contains the dialectics of homogenizing and essentializing the group 
according to a single characteristic and thus reducing them to the label. On the other hand, the claim for 
compensation cannot be made without precise distinctions between those who have a right to receive 
compensation and those who do not. This dilemma cannot be overcome by more euphemistic (politically 
correct) words. It must be taken into consideration each time a group is characterized. A common approach 
is to distinguish between the person and the issue (low-literate adults) instead of making the issue a label 
(low-literates).  
8 Roughly 80% of those considered to perform on a level called functional illiteracy hold a school 
qualification. The definition of functional illiteracy corresponds with UNESCO-Definitions: “A person is 
functionally literate who can engage in all those activities in which literacy is required for effective 
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functioning of his group and community and also for enabling him to continue to use reading, writing and 
calculation for his own and the community’s development“ (sources and discussion: deleted for anonymity.  
9 The framework then points at the work by Tom Schuller and Richard Desjardin`s who, under the idea of 
rational choice approaches, stand for the approach of Wider Benefits of Learning. 
10 I_Q 05f About yourself - Cultural engagement - Voluntary work for non-profit organizations. Answers: 
Never, Less than once a month, Less than once a week but at least once a month, At least once a week but 
not every day, Every day. 
11 IQ06a About yourself – Political efficacy – No influence on the government, Answers: Strongly agree, 
Agree, Neither agree nor disagree, Disagree, Strongly disagree. 
12 IQ 07a About yourself – Social trust – Trust only few people, Answers: Strongly agree, Agree, Neither 
agree nor disagree, Disagree, Strongly disagree. The Variable "IQ 07b About yourself – Social trust – Other 
people take advantage of me"  has not been used here, because it is part of a construct made of two variables 
(IQ07a , IQ07b), which tests social trust. As the others are not constructs but merely single variables (IQ05, 
IQ06) it felt fairer to use one variable each and not two for social trust, one for political efficacy and one 
for volunteering. 
13 All differences are statistically significant. 
14 Former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder (social democrats) claimed in 2001, job agencies should 
show more strictness against those unemployed who are unwilling to work. The tabloid press (BILD) quotes 
him stating “There is no right to laziness in our society” .  
15 Vice Chancellor Sigmar Gabriel (social democrats) stated at a press conference in April 2016 concerning 
the new immigration law (SZ 15.4.2016) Germany would not want "Integration simulators" 
(“Integrationssimulanten”), he meant refugees who would only pretend they would want to integrate.  
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